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We begin with a definition. 
There's a distinction to be made between memory and remembrance. It 
is a distinction suggested initially by Freud, who used the terms memoire voluntaire 
for memory and memoire involuntaire for remembrance.1 Whilst memory serves 
to put the past into some semblance of order, absorbing what has been remembered 
into a deliberate continuum which locates the distant past at one end and the present 
at the other, remembrance destroys the separation of past and present. In other 
words, at those moments when images from the past are triggered by sensations 
which are being experienced in the present, remembrance manages to fuse the past 
with the present. In this way the linear continuity that is generally seen, via memory, 
to exist between the past and present is taken apart, deconstructed. Linearity is no 
longer then accepted as a given so much as its deconstruction becomes a fact. 
Time that was lost may in this way no longer seem to be so, for through 
remembrance that past is not made subject to an act of revival but one of renewal. 
Remembrance functions as at once the result of performance and a paradigm for 
performance itself 
We begin again with a statement. A position. 
That which we comprehend as the real is only ever in the here and now of 
the perceiver, whilst that which has been experienced ceases to be 'real' and 
becomes memory. That which is to come (the word, the sentence, the breath after 
this) is no more than imagination as projection. Accordingly, just as the real is 
intrinsically corporeal, so the unreal world must always be greater in substance 
than the real. 
Performance is an endless present and its time-based nature keeps pace 
with the watcher, moving from moment to moment with a shared synchronicity. 
However, within this permanent and perpetual present an apparent contradiction 
exists. It does so because performance continues to offer itself to us as a motif of 
the referenced past and the referential future... of the 4 as was' via the 'as if towards 
an always elusive 'to be'. Performance tends thus to deal with the past and the 
future more strongly than the present. In this way, convention leads to the 
conventional... what we know from past experience fuels a capacity to imagine 
that which will probably follow. We live through performance in a semi-comatose 
state of memory, remembrance and prediction, a knowing state of departure and 
arrival which takes us down routes so familiar as to pass in a blur. 
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In opting for the performance to take us somewhere we have to miss the 
moments, more swift than prediction, wherein the performance is always already 
and always only forever in the here and in the now. Whether we view from the 
perspective of director, performer, spectator (or any combination thereof) the fact 
of the intrinsic incompleteness of performance augurs against any imposition of 
fixity. All that we have is the now . . . and yet we can only know that 'now' 
through acts of memory. 
Taoist philosophy would have it otherwise, arguing that we can only know 
the 'now' through an act of being, which involves the conscious disconnecting of 
memories, but this is to place one's faith in a contradictory belief system. For the 
notion of conscious disconnection carries within it a reliance on memory. Without 
an act of memory one would not be able to remember to forget. 
Despite its potential for immediacy, performance continues to locate itself 
as past or present in its use of text. To offer a prosaic example, we can say that 
within a performance text one is more likely to hear the words 'I am going for a 
walk' or 'I have been out for a walk' than 'I am walking'. In this performance 
seems to fear either tautology or contradiction. The speaker is walking, in which 
case the words describe the also seen, or the speaker is not walking, in which case 
the words are a type of blind. However, if my opening remarks on reality as 
corporeality are sustainable - if the 'real' is that which has not been experienced 
but which is being experienced in the moment - then any 'truth' of performance 
can only ever exist within its own emphatic concentration on the now. 
Where this argument falters is at the point of creativity as an innately 
imaginative process - again, either in terms of product-creation or spectatorship. 
We do not merely make or see, we make and we see within the context of 
performance. Art-perception then is an act of imagination, and we are unable to 
imagine that which we cannot remember. This is true of all human perception. 
Memory, therefore, becomes the mainstay of creativity. Without memory there 
can be no imagination, ergo without memory there can be no art. If, as with 
Taoism, we disclaim the yogic belief in transcendence via meditation, we can say 
that the human brain is not like a computer, where remembrance can be overridden 
at will. The fact that we are not able to disassociate ourselves from remembrance 
is precisely that which allows us to engage in imaginative watching. Performance 
is not an act of memory and remembrance, it is memory. 
We use memory as a means not just towards creativity, but also towards 
our own creation. Without remembrance we would be unable to say whom it is 
that we are, and without this we would be unable to say what it is that we see. 
Without constructions of memory we could not compare like with like, for no 
comparable 'other' would exist.2 Without memory, one would need to rely on 
others to fill in the details of one's own past, which would constitute no less of a 
reliance on memory than if that memory were one's own. 
Memory is connected to language, as is imagination. We can neither 
remember nor imagine that which we cannot identify, and we cannot identify that 
which we cannot name. 
Making work for performance is an act of memory translated into 
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imagination. The past is trawled in order to create. The assessment of an artist's 
creativity is not arrived at through a measuring out of the distance between that 
which is remembered and that which is subsequently made. It is not the case, for 
example, that a domestic memory involving two people and eight words spoken 
needs to be reconfigured for five performers and sixty words. The act of making 
the private past public and performative — of telling secrets to strangers — is no 
less creative an activity than the most radical re-invention . . . which is not the 
same thing as arguing for a domestic relocation. 
All performance is only ever disguised autobiography - of what has or 
what might have been - and all reception is a filtering of' other' through the complex 
idiosyncrasies of' self.' The memories of the makers merge with the remembrances 
of the watchers. 
5 Memories 
1: Gertrude Stein wrote of her first flight that she had seen the flattened out Paris 
as a cubist landscape in the way that Picasso must have imagined it to look, long 
before he ever flew. Picasso was thus credited with the ability to 'see' from a 
perspective he had never experienced. That this is a leap of consciousness and 
that it resulted in the first fundamentally new proposition about the way paintings 
were made in five hundred years is not in doubt. But Picasso's imagination was 
not without memory. The Eiffel Tower was completed when Picasso was eight 
and it created a vision of Paris based on patterned formality rather than perspective 
and depth. The Wright brothers' first flight occurred when Picasso was twenty-
two. In 1850 most Europeans lived rural lives, by 1890 most of them lived in 
towns and cities. The age was an age of new perspectives and those new 
perspectives were of scale, of pace and of height. 
In the midst of life we can imagine death. That imagination is memory is 
not the same thing as saying that memories only stem from that which has been 
directly experienced. 
2: These words are being written in the early hours of December 3rd, 1999. Five 
hours after watching Forced Entertainment's Disco Relax at the Green Room, 
Manchester in the North West of England.3 Whilst my memory of this performance 
cannot be trusted, it has at least the dubious advantage of being fresh. That the 
work did not work for me is unimportant... not least because this paper does not 
constitute a 'review'. What matters is that Disco Relax failed to connect with me 
precisely because the memories it drew on appeared to be the memories of earlier 
work and that it translated these memories into sentimentality . . . if we recognize 
sentimentality as that which seeks familiar responses to familiar stimuli, of memory 
and projection as something not just causal but formulaic. 
The experience of Disco Relax was like watching an old champion 
repeating moves from a glorious youth. Rather than trusting to the imaginative 
leaps that made the journey possible we witness little more than a retreat to the 
grooves that were once so surprisingly traveled in. This amounts to memory as 
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memory and it is this that makes Disco Relax read like the stubbed out cigarette 
end of postmodernism. 
This is not to say that the work is less postmodern than it ever was, but 
that postmodernism has collapsed to the point wherein the quotation marks are 
now around nothing other than earlier quotation marks drawn in by the self-same 
hand. We know that postmodern performance is characterized by its treatment of 
the past with an ironic and (oh so) cool detachment. Stripped of its authenticating 
powers, of its authority, the past has become the stuff of fragmentation, quotation 
and collage. Accordingly, narrative reads to us now — and has done for some 
years — as a system which favors the bogus there and then over the here and now. 
But aren't our own spectatorial memories already so overloaded with these beliefs 
that the -ism has devoured its currency along with its self? 
What was once a paradigm of postmodern performance remains so. It is 
not the fact that the work is rooted in the past that is the problem, but that the past 
is so firmly rooted in the work. 
The dilemma for postmodernism is that the ways in which the past is 
brought into the present substitute renewal for parody. The past is not made more 
honest by dint of the alchemy of quotation marks, and when that past is itself the 
past of recycled performance, then the result is not interrogation so much as 
regurgitation . . . for nothing dates as quickly as the nearly new. At the end of a 
century where change has come more rapidly than ever before, where our memoires, 
both voluntaire and involuntaire, are vast, we are reducing performance to a 
polysemia that sacrifices imaginative eclecticism to pluralism, essentialism to 
emptiness and memory to duplication. 
3: In response to a request from Allan Kaprow to do the stupidest thing he could 
think of, followed by the smartest, a student hung pickles from live cables, filling 
the room with smoke and stench. This was his 'stupid' act. The following day he 
repeated the act as his 'smartest.'4 The example works in a direct converse to 
Disco Relax because the transformation is in the repetition... indeed the repetition 
is intrinsically transformative. Our knowledge of the way that it was results in our 
reading of the way that it is. What was stupid becomes smart. The alternative to 
this, if memory serves, is that the once smart starts to read as the joke twice told 
4: Brecht told us this, as he argued against the very canonization of technique that 
has been used to calcify his own once-innovatory practice- 'Time flows on methods 
wear out, stimuli fail. New problems loom up and demand new techniques. The 
means of representation must alter . . . . What was popular yesterday is no longer 
so today."5 
Lyotard's notion that 'The artist and the writer . . . are working without 
rules in order to formulate the rules of -what will have been done"6 is no longer 
true of postmodernism. The rules are now so well established as to be published in 
what amount to 'how to' guides.7 Postmodernism has become the mainstay culture 
it once so tellingly critiqued, and its effectiveness is no more now than memory. 
Postmodern performance is no longer searching for forms that in their 
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own turn inform the times. What was once the functional (re)presentation of a 
dysfunctional world has become its own reverse. Postmodernism is possessed of 
currency only for so long as it explores the paradox of creating effective 
performance at the same time as it does not know what effect it seeks. When this 
effect is determined in advance postmodernism drifts towards functionalism, and 
functionalism is no more than an overreliance on the memory of once vital forms. 
5: In 1995 Binjamin Wilkomirski had a book published.8 The book, 
Fragments, was a book of memories — memories of the Holocaust, told from the 
perspective of one who had survived the Nazi death camps. The author was feted 
along with the book, and the world took note. 
That Wilkomirski's memories have been exposed as the seemingly untrue 
(to the extent that the author has been 'outed' as the non-Jewish Bruno Dossekker) 
does not negate their existence—or even importance—as art. Issues of authenticity 
belong in the world of morality and ethics (if they belong anywhere at all) rather 
than within the liminality of work offered to be read as art. And just as with 
performance, what goes into art is generally not as important as what comes out. 
The art of memories becomes a catalyst for our own memories of art. In this we 
can say that the 'authenticity' of Steven Spielberg's Jewishness does not make 
Schitidler's List a better work of art than Fragments. 
We would do well to remember Nietzsche's claim that truths are no more 
than "illusions we have forgotten are illusions.9 
We cannot trust the truth we know because our knowledge of truth is 
itself a memory, unstable and insecure. What matters in art is not the truth of our 
memories, but the way that we remember and the way that this remembrance is 
renewed. The invention of a knowingly 'false' memory is already an imaginative 
act in a way that the repetition of a 'true' experience can never be. 
If postmodernism has taught us nothing else, it is that we can trust neither 
the teller nor the tale. All that we can trust is that the teller is telling. All that we 
can hope is that the tale is worth hearing. All that we can know is that, once heard, 
nothing will ever be quite the same again. 
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